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been cited more than any other Kentucky case on the subject, and has
been followed in Ky. Ind. Oil Co. v. Schnitzler, Adm'r., 208 Ky. 508, 271
S. W. 570 (1925). Because of the impractibility of applying this test
by placing the different articles in their proper class this distinguish-
Ing process is highly undesirable. The courts usually prefer to take the
first exception stated by Judge Sanborn and treat that as the basis of
liability. Osheroff v. Rhodes-Burford Co., 203 Ky. 408, 262 9. W. 583,
(1924).
Practically every Kentucky opinion rendered in this field of negli-
gence contains the words, "imminently, inherently or intrinsically"
dangerous, and many of them make that the test of liability. This is
most unfortunate. The extreme difficulty in determining just what the
character of the article, the act of the defendant, and the relation of
the parties must be to permit a proper application of these adverbs as
a test will be seen in the cases. Articles treated as "imminently or
inherently" dangerous: a brake rod on a railroad coach, Ward v. Pull-
man Co., 138 Ky. 554, 128 S. W. 606 (1910); an automobile, Olds Motor
Works v. Shaffer, supra; gasoline poured into a retailer's kerosene
tank, Ky Ind. Oil Co. v. Schnitzler, Adm'r., supra; a steering wheel on
a farm tractor, Goullon v. Ford Motor Co., 44 Fed. (2nd) 310 (1930);
hair dressing, Cahill v. Inecto, Inc., 203 N. Y. S. 1 (1924). Articles
treated as not "Imminently or inherently" dangerous: an elevator,
Slmons v. Gregory, 120 Ky. 116, 85 S. W. 751 (1905); combustible oil
in an oil engine, Berger v. Standard Oil Co., 126 Ky. 155, 103 S. W. 245
(1907); a defectively installed cook stove, Besinger Outfitting Co. v.
Seamans, Adm'r.. 213 Ky. 157. 208 S. W. 941 (1926); a gas flatiron,
.Pitman v. Lynn Gas d Electric Co., 241 Mass. 322, 35 N. E. 233 (1922);
defective circus seats, Lareabee v. Des Moines Tent and Awning Go.
et al., 189 Iowa 319, 178 N. W. 373 (1920).
The law on this subject seems to be rather definitely settled. As a
consequence of the past quarter century development, very little
remains of that former immunity of manufacturers from liability for
negligence in the fabrication of "non-dangerous" articles. "Things of
danger" in this field of the law are what a growing civilization
demands them to be. Therefore it seems that more just and consistent
decisions would result If the courts applied the test laid down by Judge
Cardozo rather than the one followed in the principle case (Nehi
Bottling Go. v. Thomas).
JAs. T. HATCHm.
SURETY-CONTRACTOR's BoND-LiABILITY TO M ATEIAITE .- In the
May, 1931, issue of the Kentucky Law Journal there may be found a
case comment on the case of Standard Oil Co. v. National Surety Co.,
234 Ky. 764; 29 S. W. (2d) 29. This case was cited as controlling in
the case of Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States Gypsum Co.,
239 Ky. 247; 39 S. W. (2d) 234.
By the terms of the bond in the latter (and principal) case the
surety was bound to a hotel company in the sum of $241,197, the con-
dition being: "If the principal (contractor) shall faithfully perform
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the contract on his part and fully indemnify and save harmless the
owner from all cost and damage which he may suffer by reason of
failure so to do and shall fully reimburse and repay the owner for all
outlay and expense which the owner may incur in making good such
default and shall pay all persons who have contracts directly with the
principal for labor or materials, then this obligation shall be null and
void. Otherwise, it shall remain in full force and effect." The court
was called upon in this case to decide the following question: "Was
the bond so far and so directly for the benefit of the sub-contractor that
it can maintain against the surety company an action thereon?" It Is
suggested that the court's answer to this question amounts to a nulli-
fication, in fact if not in language, of the very essence of third party
law.
Since the legal obligations which follow on the formation of a
contract are voluntarily assumed it is natural that the courts should
not make that obligation greater than the parties contemplated. The
intention of the parties is a matter of fact to be'determined from their
language as intekpreted in the light of the surrounding circumstances;
and the intention of the parties in no case is to be reached primarily
by legal logic. The conclusion as to the effect of a factual situation
must be reached through a consideration of the facts themselves, and
not by means of a series of legal presumptions, principles, or sylogisms
which but vaguely reflect the true situation.
It is a natural inference that the parties to a contract primarily
intend to benefit only themselves. However the courts have allowed
the introduction of evidence and agreement to disprove this inference,
and justly so; they have given to strangers a right of action where it
appears that the parties intended they should have the benefit of the
contract. But they have retained as the very essence of the law of
third party contracts the principle that the third party must prove
his right by showing that the contract was intended for his benefit.
Has the Kentucky court sustained this principle, or not?
The above discussion would seem to support the contention that in
any contract case the court must determine at least three vital ques-
tions:
1. Is there a promise?
2. What is the extent of the obligation created by it?
3. May the person now before the court enforce that obligation
because:
A. He is the promisee;
B. The promise though made to another was made for his
benefit?
Now it cannot be too strongly urged that number two must never be
confused with number three. It would be necessary to decide number
two even though there was no third party question involved; con-
sequently the decision on this point cannot be a sine qua non by which
to determine the distinct factual question raised by three. A promise
by A to B to pay C certainly raises an obligation to pay C; but one
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would be presuming a great deal if he should decide without more
and In view of the burden of proof on the third party that there was an
intention to benefit the latter.
In the Standard Oil case the court stated the law in regard to
materialmen's rights in regard to contractor's bonds thus: "We have
in Kentucky two distinct lines of decisions in cases of this character.
If the bond, when read in connection with the contract, contains a
provision obligating the contractor to pay for the material, or to com-
pensate the laborers, it constitutes a provision for the benefit of the
laborers and materialmen, upon which they are entitled to maintain an
action directly against the surety." Cases. "On the other hand, when
the bond is one solely to secure performance of the contract and con-
tains no language from which an express covenant for the benefit of
third parties may be derived, an action thereon by a stranger to the
contract may not be maintained." Cases. The court here demands, in
the first and controlling portion of the above, as a condition precedent
to the third party's right of action:
1. A promise---"contains a provision obligating the contractor
to pay";
2. The extent of the obligation--"for the material or to com-
pensate the laborers";
3. But when we get to the vital point of issue, the right of the
person now before the court to maintain an action, we find
not only that there is no demand that he establish his rights,
but also that the court is willing to conclusively presume that
"it constitutes a piovision for the benefit of" said third par-
ties. So it is suggested that the court has destroyed the
essence of third party law by holding that where a third party
once had to establish an intention to benefit himself, his right
will now be conclusively presumed from the existence of an
obligation to anyone to pay him-and for emphasis-regard-
less of the actual reason the parties had for creating a promise
to pay him. Trde the court says in the second portion of its
statement that the materialmen shall have no right where
there is "no language from which an express covenant for the
benefit of third parties may be derived"; but the effect of the
implied admission that the express covenant must be shown
to have been made for the benefit of the third party is
destroyed and rendered of no effect by the court's prior holding
that the'intention to benefit exists where there is a promise to
pay. The court simply holds that two and three in the above
suggested problems are one and the same; thereby making
three dependent on two; with the consequence that all the
third party need show is that the parties in defining the extent
of their liability mentioned his name.
Another example of this failure to distinguish two from three is
found in this statement of the court: "The true basis for the diverg-
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ing decisions is found in the terms of the instruments involved." One
finds it easy enough to define the extent of liability in such a manner,
but more difficult to discover the fact-the intention to benefit-from a
mere promise which makes no mention of such intention and without
reference to extrinsic factual circumstances. In the principal case the
latter is complicated even further by the fact that the extent of the
liability, the words of promise according to the court, is derived not
from express words of promise, but from a promise constructed from
what is apparently meant to be a definition of the extent of the liability
of the promise made in an earlier part of the bond. The interesting
question arises as to just how a promise to indemnify an owner against
liability to materialmen could be made without giving the latter a
right of action which would seem to be what the parties attempted to
do in the principal case.
W. H. DYSAsD.
TORTS-;IABILITY OF A CITY FOR DEFECTS IN STRETs.-Plaintiff, a
small boy, was riding his pony at a street intersection in Paducah. A
hole 3 to 5 inches deep and 8 or 10 inches wide caused the pony to fall
whereby the plaintiff suffered injurfes. The hole had been worn in the
street at a point where the concrete gutter and asphalt joined, and the
evidence showed that the city knew or should have known of the
hole's existence. The plaintiff was not found to be contributorily negli-
gent and was permitted to recover. The court held that a city was not
an insurer of the safety of persons who traveled its streets, but that
it was bound to maintain its streets in a reasonably safe condition for
the character of travel for which they were maintained. That in the
absence of reasonable care the city was liable for injuries resulting
from defects in its streets, of which the city had notice, actual or con-
structive. Paducah v. Konkle, 236 Ky. 582, 33 S. W. (2nd) 608.
The case follows both the general rule in Kentucky, and the
United States. In Evans v. City of Atlanta, 139 Ga. 433, 77 S. E. 378,
the court held that a city was liable for injuries which proximately
resulted from its failure to keep its streets in a reasonably safe condi-
tion for ordinary travel, either at night or day, provided the injured
party was not guilty of contributory negligence. The case of Stern v.
international Railroad Go., 220 N. Y. 284, 115 N. E. 759, held that a city
was liable for injuries resulting from a railway pole erected in the
street, on the ground that it was unreasonably dangerous. Howard v.
City of New Orleans, 159 La. 443, 105 So. 443, held that a city was liable
for defective streets, even though as a general rule it was not liable
for injuries occasioned in the exercise of its governmental functions.
In Shreve v. City of Fort Wayne, 176 Ind. 347, 96 N. E. 7, the court
ruled that a city must keep its traveled ways, and those indicated as
for travel, in a reasonably safe condition. Some Kentucky cases that
are in accord with the principal case of City of Paducah v. Ronkle,
supra, are: City of Louisville v. Hough, 157 Ky. 643, 163 S. W. 1101;
Biccel Asphalt Paving Go. v. Yeager, 176 Ky. 712, 197 S. W. 417; Tudor
v. City of Louisville, 172 Ky. 429, 189 S. W. 456.
